US Naval War College - Grand Strategy
"Just So” Stories? Causal Inference, Operational Codes, and Military Strategy from Iraq and Afghanistan
Strategic Culture: Facilitating Business Strategy
Colin F. Jackson, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Strategy and Policy, U.S. Naval War College
The U.S. Naval War College is home to some of the greatest thinking our nation possesses on the creation and execution of strategy. So significantly, that numerous leading educational institutions (e.g. Yale, Harvard, Penn, Johns Hopkins University, and Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy of Tufts University) are now featuring former War College professors to provide students with the military’s strategic thinking, planning, and implementation capability. With increasingly rapid and complex change facing corporate environments, it is opportune for us to learn from military expertise in managing more advanced levels of change and ambiguity.
Center to the military’s creating winning strategy is the understanding that survival of organizations in competitive environments depends on their responses to a perennial set of choices. In the words of James March, organizations must decide how much effort to invest in the “exploitation” of existing ideas and processes and how much to devote to the “exploration” of genuinely new ones. The answers to these questions depend on the organization’s explanation of past events. What explains the dramatic rise and subsequent collapse in energy prices over the past 24 months? Why did security conditions in Iraq improve in 2007 and 2008? Such explanations are shaped not only by objective characteristics of the historical events, but also by the organizations’ shared beliefs about the nature of the environment and the laws of cause and effect in that domain – in short, the organization’s operational code.
American military strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates formidable obstacles to historical inference and strategy formulation on the part of large organizations. And, our experience with counterinsurgency since 2003 underlines the perils of organizational explanations that overstate the strategists’ control/influence and understate the role of competitors’ actions and chance. Commercial military organizations must grapple not only with changes in their competitive environments but also with the influence of their existing causal beliefs on the interpretation of performance and the development of effective strategies. Drawing on recent military and commercial cases, Dr. Jackson’s session will highlight the practical importance of valid, historical inference – the process of explaining past outcomes and relating those explanations to prospective choices.
This session pre-approved by HRCI for 1.5 recertification credits - Strategic Credit*